Introduction
In Sweden, we have a few well-known cases of unauthorised access to privacy data when some politicians and celebrities were getting medical care at hospitals. In all these cases patients' medical data was read by some hospital employees who had access to the patient record system but no connection whatsoever to the patients' care, hence they had no reasons to access the patients' medical record. These unauthorised accesses were detected because:
1. All accesses to medical data are securely logged, and 2. It was known that people are interested in these cases not because of medical reasons but because of curiosity. In some of the cases the information was released to the tabloid press. The combination of these two makes the detection of unauthorised access easy. Now assume that the very ordinary guy Joe Smith is hospitalised and that Joe has a very curious neighbour who is a medical doctor working at the same hospital as Joe is getting his medical care. In Joe's case, there is no suspicion that someone would be interested to know about his medication. This means that although the information that Joe's neighbour has accessed his medical record is logged, this access was unauthorised and is never detected.
The reason for not preventing these kinds of unauthorised accesses using the traditional access control mechanisms is that there is a trade-off between confidentiality requirement and the availability requirement in the system. For example, in many situations, it is hard to predefine all the access needs; this makes the access control policy incomplete, since it will not cover all the access possibilities. There are unpredictable or emergency situations where the needs for access permission are not defined in the access control policy in advance. For example in our hospital scenario it is an access control policy that allows only the primary care physician to access the medical records for a given patient, but the system does not prevent other medical employees to access the patient's medical record because not all emergency situations can be predicted and not all these situations can be specified in a computer system.
In this paper we introduce an access control model for these scenarios encoded using the XACML 2.0 standard. This model is based on Discretionary Overriding of Access Control originally presented in [8] . This access control model provides a multi-level logging mechanism that simplifies detection of those unauthorised access that are not usually detected by the traditional logging mechanisms.
Overriding of Access Control
Rissanen et. al. [8] suggest a flexible solution which is called Discretionary Overriding of Access Control. This solution gives the subject of the access control policy the possibility to override the denied access, and it requires the overriding process to be audited, and a notification needs to be sent to a management authority. It differs from other solutions in that it has the notion of Authority Resolution, which is an automatic procedure that, given information about an override and an access control policy, finds who is in a position to audit and approve the override in a retroactive manner. The discretionary override mechanism increases the flexibility of the access control model to handle hard to specify or unanticipated situations.
Standardizing Access Control
According to [3] , many of the current access control and authorization systems implement access control mechanisms in a proprietary way. This makes them limited to specific applications and cannot be used for open distributed networks, in which there is a need for sharing access control related information between different autonomous domains. Therefore a common language is needed to express different access control polices for such situations [6] .
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), which is standardized by OASIS [4] , promises to be a powerful and flexible policy language for heterogeneous distributed systems. XACML provides a general-purpose access control policy language.
The XACML policy model consists of three components: policy set, policy and rule. The rule is the basic component of an XACML policy; it has a target which contains attributes for matching the subject, resource, action, and environment, to check if the given rule is applicable to a specific request. It has also an effect that may contain either a permit or a deny value. The rule condition can be used for defining boolean expressions that limits the applicability of the rule. Rules need to be encapsulated in a policy and cannot exist in isolation. The policy, which represents a single access control policy expressed through a set of rules, has a target, a set of obligations, and rule combining algorithms. To enable a PDP to find which policy to be applied, the target is used. The target is a set of conditions identified by the definition of the resource, subject, and action that a rule, policy or policy set is intended to evaluate. The policy set is a container that holds other policies or policy sets as well as references to policies in remote locations. Policy set also has a target, a set of obligations, and a set of policy combining algorithms.
XACML provides a standard set of combining algorithms for combining rules and for combining policies, such as the permit-override rule-combining algorithm, which operates at the rule level and the permit-overrides policy-combining algorithm, which operates at the policy level. Policy combining algorithms are useful for solving conflicts between multiple policies when policies give different authorization decisions. These algorithms do not deal with combination of obligations, since they simply collect and return obligations from the policies which have been evaluated to the desired effect. XACML does not provide a way for solving conflicts between obligations for example by expressing precedence for a specific obligation over another. As a result it is hard to distinguish between two similar permissions, one without obligations and another with obligations, which is necessary for cases such as the access control policy override. Obligation combining algorithms need to be introduced within the XACML specification to help in handling more general access control models.
In a typical XACML scenario, the user will send an access request to the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), which could be a web server or a file server which protects a set of resources. The PEP will create a decision request that contains the requester's information (Subject, Object, Action and any other related information), then it will send the decision request to the Policy Decision Point (PDP), which will evaluate the request against the applicable policies and then return the response which contains the access decision and a set of obligations to the PEP.
Based on the decision response and the set of obligations from the PDP, the PEP allows or denies the access, and discharges the set of associated obligations.
One can imagine the advantages of introducing the discretionary overriding of access control mechanism in a powerful and standardized framework such XACML, and this is the goal of this paper.
Discretionary override in XACML
Once the user has been successfully authenticated to the system, the system needs to know the set of resources that the user is allowed to access, and the set of actions that he is allowed to perform on a given resource.
The main question here is: how can we apply the ideas of the Discretionary Overriding of Access Control using the XACML framework?
The An obligation is an operation specified by the policy or the policy set that should be performed by the PEP in conjunction with the enforcement of an authorization decision [10] . Obligations are very useful since they allow adding constraints or provisional actions to access control policies. We choose XACML obligations to represent the discretionary override actions. An override obligation shall consist of three actions that need to be triggered by PEP.
1. PEP shall inform the user that it is an override and not an ordinary permitted access. 2. PEP shall send a notification for the responsible authority for retroactive approval of the override access. 3. PEP shall log the override access in a specific way which is not the same as logging the permitted accesses. XACML defines a way for adding obligations to access control policies, and specifies an evaluation process for the obligations at the policy and policy set level based on the matching of an effect (Permit/Deny) value in the policy or policy set with the FulfillOn value in the obligation: a given obligation is included in the result only if its FulfillOn attribute is the same as the resulting effect of the policy. Current XACML specification (version 2.0) lack a defined structure for obligations; there are no defined types or categories that help the policy writer to use these obligations in a generic way; the exact implementation is left open and the PEP needs to understand the implementation to be able to discharge the obligations.
Here, we introduce access override as a specific type of obligation, which we call override-obligation. The override obligation means that the PEP has to log the access in a certain way, prompt the user for confirmation before performing the access and a notification needs to be sent to the responsible authority. In case there are permissions both with and without such an obligation, then the normal access right should have priority, and there is no need for special logging, and no need for notifying the responsible authority. Therefore we need a way for combining obligations, which does not exist in the current XACML specification.
We have been able to implement the override mechanism using obligations to represent the override with ordered policies and the first-applicable policy-combining algorithm. This approach will not work well when the order of policies is unpredictable, since in our case the normal access permission should take the precedence even if its policy is not the first applicable.
We have also implemented a custom policy-combining algorithm, which is able to understand particular types of obligations such as the override-obligation, in addition to its ability to handle policies' effects. Although it is conceivable that a policy-combining algorithm would take obligations into account "out-of-band" in this manner when combining the effects of policies, this is not the intended design of XACML policy-combining algorithms and the approach does not generalize well for using many different kinds of obligations simultaneously. So this custom algorithm is a kludge to solve the problem and a cleaner, more explicit solution is desirable and we have concluded that XACML should be extended to support the override mechanism. For solving the problem, we propose a general solution, which we are going to discuss in the next section.
Proposed solution for handling XACML obligations in a general way
For solving the problem of combination of obligations we provide a general solution which is divided in two parts: one for handling effects (effects-combining algorithm), which is similar to the standard policy-combining algorithm but with some changes to its interface, and another algorithm, which is an extension point for handling obligations (obligations-combining algorithm).
We define the interaction between these two algorithms in a precise and general way. This enables us to define input and output for these algorithms in a general way and to use different combinations of effects-combining algorithms and obligations-combining algorithms.
By defining the input and output of the general obligations-combining algorithm, it has been possible to create a chain of obligations-combining algorithms; each has its different purpose and is particular to specific types of obligations. This helps us to introduce the override mechanism as obligations while supporting other obligations that need further processing by different algorithms.
In the general design which consists of two combining algorithms, the effects-combining algorithm operates at the policy set level by evaluating the entire set of policies in the policy set. The result shall contain a single effect, a list of sets of obligations and a special set for obligations that come directly from the policy set. This result forms the input for the second combining algorithm. The second algorithm is the obligations-combining algorithm which can be a single obligations-combining algorithm to achieve one purpose such as the access override, or it can be a chain of obligations-combining algorithms, where each has its inputs and outputs for different purposes, such as access override, encryption, notification, truncation…etc.
Consider how the desired evaluation process should be implemented for these algorithms. The first algorithm, which will treat the policies' effects, will take a list of policies as an input and it will evaluate their effects to return one final result that could be either Permit, Deny, NotApplicable, or Indeterminate. This looks similar to the way that the standard policy-combining algorithms of XACML are working. But since we want to introduce a separate mechanism for combining obligations, the obligations should not be collected into a single set by the effects combining algorithm, rather the algorithm has to keep the sets of applicable obligations from the separate policies separate. Also it has to deal with policies without obligations. This is needed for the evaluation process of the obligations-combining algorithm in which there is a need to distinguish between the normal permitted access and the one which is permitted with an override obligation. We will not pay attention to the cases where the final result is NotApplicable or Indeterminate, since no obligations need to be returned in these cases. So the following results are the possible results from the effects-combining algorithm:
• Deny with sets of obligations which their FulfillOn values match the Deny effect.
• Permit with/without sets of override obligations and/or other obligations which their FulfillOn values match the Permit effect.
We begin with a small example illustrating our proposed extension to XACML and consider the obligations that will result from the effects-combining algorithm. These obligations will be input to the obligations-combining algorithm. In a typical situation there will be a policy set which has a number of policies. Some of these policies may contain override obligations or any other type of obligations, and the others may not. Note that the obligations may come from the policy set itself; these obligations do not belong to any specific policy and need to be fulfilled if they match the final effect of their policy set, See figure 1. In our proposed approach, a general result for applying the effects-combining algorithm on this policy set we will be the following (by assuming that all the policies' effects and obligations match the final result of the policy set):
Where X is either permit or deny, the sets of obligations in the middle are the obligations which are to be combined and the last "[ ]" is a working set which will start empty, and is explained in detail later. Note that oblg3 is treated as a special obligation since it is part of the policy set. The override obligation could be any one of oblg1, or oblg2, but the existence of another set of obligations or an empty list [ ] within the list of obligations along with the Permit effect, means that there is a normal access permission and no need for overriding. These obligations also could be normal obligations that need to be fulfilled directly, or can be passed to another combining algorithm for further processing; The categorizations of obligations proposed by Michiharu Kudo [5] are useful for understanding what such other combining algorithms should do for particular obligations. Also note that it is possible to have policies without obligations, which is represented by the empty set [ ]. This will help the obligations-combining algorithm to give the precedence for normal permitted access in case of the existence of two policies, one giving normal permit and another giving a permit with override obligations. The additional working set, which is empty at the start of evaluation, is introduced to carry the result from the obligations-combining algorithm. Each obligation combining algorithm places those obligations which it combines into this set, which in the end will contain all combined obligations. Consider the following two policy sets example: First, consider the leftmost policy set. Let us say that the effects-combining algorithm is permit-overrides in this case, and the final result of the effects-combining algorithm is Permit. In the leftmost policy set, policy 1 has an override obligation OVR, policy 2 has an other obligation OTH that could be e.g. for encryption or sending emails, and policy 3 does not contain any obligations. The policy set itself has some other obligation OTH'. With our proposed extension to XACML, we will get the following output from the effects-combining algorithm:
<Permit, ([OVR], [OTH], [ ]), OTH', [ ]>
When these obligations are passed to the override obligations-combining algorithm, it should return only OTH and OTH':
<Permit, ([ ], [OTH], [ ]), OTH', [ ]>
Since there is a Permit decision from a policy which does not have an override obligation, the access should be permitted without need for explicit override. Thus the override obligation is dropped from the final result by the obligations-combining algorithm. In the rightmost example policy set, the Permit, Deny and Deny effects from the three policies will be combined into a single effect for the whole policy set. Again, for the sake of argument, assume that the effects-combining algorithm is permit-overrides, which will give the following result:
<Permit, ([OVR]), OTH', [ ]>
When these obligations are passed to the obligationscombining algorithm, it should return OVR, which will be placed in the working set, and OTH' which will remain in the set containing the obligations from the policy set:
<Permit, ([ ]), OTH', [OVR]>
In this case we have a possible-with-override access. Note that the obligations in the policy set are also preserved.
The evaluation strategy of the obligations-combining algorithm which is needed for the override case can be summarized as follows:
If there are permissions both with and without an override obligation, then the normal access right should have priority, and there should be no special logging, prompting or sending notification as required in the override cases, and the algorithm should discard any override obligation. The override algorithm should check the following cases:
1. In case there is at least one Permit result without an override obligation, the algorithm shall then drop any override obligations.
In case all results have override obligations,
the algorithm shall combine the obligations into a single override obligation.
Specification of the general design
The general design consists of two combining algorithms; the first one is the effects-combining algorithm that operates at the policy set level by evaluating the entire set of policies in the policy set. The result shall contain a single effect and a list of sets of obligations. This result forms the input for the second combining algorithm. The second algorithm is the obligations-combining algorithm which can be a single obligations-combining algorithm to achieve one purpose, the access control override, or it can be a chain of obligations-combining algorithms, where each has its inputs and outputs for different purposes; such as override, encryption, notification, truncation…etc.
Policy Set evaluation:
1. Match the policy set target: subjects, resources, actions, and environments with the values in the request context, to check the applicability of the given policy set to the incoming request. This target matching should be according to the specifications of Target evaluation in the XACML standard.
2.
If the target evaluates to "Match" then the value of the policy set shall be determined by the evaluation of the entire set of policies and policy sets, according to the effects-combining algorithm. In case the entire policy set/policy is evaluated to Indeterminate or NotApplicable, its result will be returned without further processing of obligations since no obligations need to be returned in this case.
Otherwise:
a. Recursively evaluate each policy (or policy set) in the policy set. If there are n number of policies the result of (Policy i ), where i is in 1 -n, will look as follow:
If there are no applicable obligations in the policy, then the set of obligations is empty.
b. Combine all the effects from (Effect 1 ) to (Effect n ) according to the specified effects-combining algorithm to get a final effect for the policy set (Permit/Deny); for example if the specified effect in the effects-combining algorithm is Permit and at least one policy evaluated to Permit, then the final effect will be Permit.
4.
Check if there are obligations in the policy set itself and whose FulfillOn values match the policy set final effect. This set of obligations will be denoted as the special obligation set (OblgS).
5.
At this step all the obligations have been collected and a single final effect is the result from the effects-combining algorithm. The following steps describe how these obligations are going to be combined using the obligations-combining algorithm:
a. Combine all the obligations that match the final effect resulted from the previous steps according to the obligationscombining algorithm. Since this algorithm is intended to be generic, and can be used for different obligation combining purposes, its input and output will be specified in a general way and the specific combining function can be specified based on the required purpose as in the override example discussed in the previous section. From the previous results the input for the obligationscombining algorithm can be expressed as:
The Effect parameter is the final effect which resulted from the policy set evaluation according to the effects-combining algorithm. The obligation sets (ObligationSet1, ObligationSet2 …) are the sets of obligations that resulted from each individual policy evaluation. Each set may contain a number of obligations that need to be processed by the combining algorithm, or it may be an empty set, which indicates the existence of one or more policies that match the target and give their effects which do not have any obligation. OblgS is the set of special obligations that come directly from the policy set. The working set is an additional set which will carry obligations which have been combined and returned by obligations-combining algorithms.
This list of obligations can be passed to a chain of obligations-combining algorithms. Each combining algorithm can be used for a specific task and will recognize and combine particular obligations. The obligations which a particular algorithm combines are placed in the working set and the remaining obligations can be passed to another obligations-combining algorithm to perform another task. As a final result of this chain of obligations combining, a set of obligations will be produced and this set is what needs to be fulfilled by the Policy Enforcement Point PEP.
b. Now as the final step, collect all remaining obligations and the working set from the last obligation combining algorithm to get the final set of obligations that need to be discharged by the PEP: <Effect, Obligations> 
Related work
Michiharu Kudo [5] tried to solve the problem that there is no definition in XACML about concrete obligations. Another problem he tried to solve is combining obligations since there is no clear way specified in XACML for combining obligations. The solution suggests two proposals, obligation categories and an obligation combining algorithm.
As a way for providing sets of useful obligations in XACML, the proposed categories define semantics of typical obligations. Some obligations need to be performed sequentially after the action, for example, a physician may start reading some medical record as an action and after that an e-mail will be sent to the patient as first obligation, then another e-mail will be sent to the primary care physician as second obligation. Some cases require information to be processed before allowing the action. For example, if personnel need to read some information from the customers' database, the information may need to be encrypted before allowing the access. This type of obligation is called data processing. The proposal suggests the following obligation categories:
For multiple obligations in the same category the solution suggests using an obligation combining algorithm which combines obligations per obligations categories. Our override case is similar to the Atomic category, in which only one obligation can be given priority.
Bill Parducci [2] proposed that to combine obligations, first the obligation categories must be combined, then combine members of each category. The proposal also suggests an exclusive sequence on the members of the same category to define precedence.
The above proposals are useful in case there is a need to have categories for obligations and there is a need to have precedence within the members of the same category. With these proposals you can not give precedence for policy based on the existence of some obligations or not. This solution does not solve the problem of having two policies, one without obligation and one with obligation and you need to give the precedence -at the policy level -to the policy without an obligation, as in the discretionary overriding mechanism, where there is a need for solution that distinguishes between normal access and the one which is possible with override. Since the possibility of overriding is designed as an obligation, the solution should understand both policies effects and obligations and give the precedence at the policy level.
Mazzoleni et. al. [7] proposed an XACML extension for handling policies in a virtual enterprise in which the access control policies are created by different autonomous domains. The proposed solution tried to solve the problem of how to integrate the policies of a virtual enterprise, where the policies are specified by different parties. In such a situation it is unclear who is responsible to make the final decision and which approach can be used to integrate the different policies. Their solution has two parts: a policy similarity process in which policies are compared with respect to the sets of requests they authorize. The second part is the policy integration preferences which is an XACML extension by which a party can specify the approach for integrating their policies with another party in the virtual enterprise. The solution gives the independent parties of the virtual enterprise the ability to specify how their policies can be integrated or overridden by other parties in the enterprise. The solution does not use XACML obligations as we did in our override mechanism, and it does not provide a general solution for integrating many policies.
Implementation
As a proof of concept, the proposed solution has been implemented using the open source Sun XACML implementation [9] . This made it possible to check how the solutions can work with different components from the XACML standard, such as the PDP, policies, request and response. The implementation also gave the chance to test the new proposed combining algorithms and to check their output by feeding the algorithms different sample policies. The implementation consists of a general purpose definition of the Obligations-Combining Algorithm interface and the particular Effects-Combining and Obligations-combinining algorithms for the override case.
Conclusion
By applying the discretionary overriding of access control within the XACML standard, a flexible and complete model for writing access control policy has been achieved. The model covers both normal access needs and override access needs. Standard XACML only allows for collecting of obligations, not combining obligations. The proposed solution provides a general way for handling particular types of obligations as override obligations, and can be used for implementing other obligation combining tasks. Since the solution uses a standard framework, it is applicable to a wide range of applications, and it is suitable for distributed systems where a common access control language is required. 
